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Applied Metascience of Neuroethics
A Commentary on Paul M. Churchland
Hannes Boelsen
This commentary is the first case study in the applied metascience of neuroethics,
that is, the application of a metascientific approach to neuroethical research. I ap-
ply a bottom-up approach to neuroethics to Churchland’s publication. The bottom-
up approach to neuroethics is a quantitative approach (based on scientometric
methods) that, among other things, allows us to outline the field from 1995 until
2012 through the development of fifteen subject categories or topic prototypes.
Each subject category or topic prototype is defined by up to thirty-one keywords
that appear frequently in the abstracts and titles of the publications in the Mainz
neuroethics bibliography. The connection strength between two subject categories
or topic prototypes depends upon the number of shared publications, that is, the
number of publications that can be assimilated to both subject categories or topic
prototypes. Accordingly, a keyword-based search of the abstract and title of any
publication in neuroethics allows us to assimilate it to (at least) one subject cat-
egory or topic prototype and, thereby, localize it within neuroethics and reveal its
degrees of relevance to neuroethical  research,  as measured by the connection
strengths between the subject categories or topic prototypes. A case study on
Churchland’s publication led to the following results: the publication is localized
in the subject category or topic prototype Moral Theory, has high degrees of rel-
evance to research that can be assimilated to the subject categories or topic pro-
totypes  Neuroimaging,  Philosophy of  Mind and Consciousness,  and  Economic
and Social Neuroscience, and has low degrees of relevance to research that can
be  assimilated  to  the  subject  categories  or  topic  prototypes  Addiction,  Brain
Death and Severe Disorders of Consciousness,  Brain Stimulation,  Enhancement,
Legal Studies,  (Medical) Research and Medicine,  Molecular Neurobiology and
Genetics, Neuroscience and Society, Neurosurgery, Psychiatric and Neurodegen-
erative Diseases and Disorders, and  Psychopharmacology.  Such results can be
fed back into neuroethical research, which, in turn, can optimize neuroethics itself
and, hence, improve our pursuit of moral understanding. The take-home messages
are as follows:  potential  follow-up studies on  Churchland’s  publication should
consider my case study results and analysis and, furthermore, future neuroethical
research should be more careful to take applied metascience of neuroethics into
account. This can be done at different stages of research. If this general idea is on
the right track, then applied metascience of neuroethics is complementary to (and
perhaps even extends) Churchland’s argument, only on a different level.
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1 Introduction
In Rules: The basis of morality…?, Churchland
points  at  several  problems for  classical  rule-
based  accounts  of  moral  knowledge  that  at-
tempt to identify morally valid behavior-guid-
ing  rules  and the  sources  of  their  authority.
Those problems (all based on the fundamental
assumption that rules in the literal sense re-
quire a language) show that we need a non-
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classical  non-rule-based  account  of  moral
knowledge. Hence, the author proposes an al-
ternative account from computational neuros-
cience based on “the best hypothesis currently
available  for  how  the  brain  both  represents
and processes information about the world […]
[and]  of  how  the  brain  learns” (Churchland
this collection, p. 8; emphasis omitted): paral-
lel  distributed  processing  (PDP).  In  PDP,  a
neural network embodies a conceptual frame-
work  that  contains  knowledge  about  the
world, that is, a configuration of attractor re-
gions,  a  family  of  prototype  representations,
or, rather, a hierarchy of categories (Church-
land 2012,  p.  33):  against  this  background,
moral knowledge is a configuration of synaptic
weights  in  a  neural  network.  Subsequently,
this insight is used to reconceive moral com-
petence, moral conflict, and moral reasoning.
Moral competence is  the personal  level com-
petence to apply sub-personal level knowledge
to  a  moral  situation  by  assimilating  it  to  a
prior learned category or prototype. A moral
conflict, however, is (at least partly) the con-
sequence  of  a  moral  situation that  has been
assimilated  to  a  category  or  prototype  of
which it is not an instance. In short, the fal-
libility of moral cognition leads to competing
interpretations  of  a  moral  situation  and
thereby  to  a  disagreement  with  others.  Ac-
cordingly, moral reasoning is (at least mostly)
not about rules and the sources of  their  au-
thority but about adequate assimilation of  a
moral situation to a category or prototype in
the first place. Finally, the author concludes:
“[k]nowing  how the  brain  works  to  generate
and constantly improve our moral understand-
ing will not obviate the need to keep it work-
ing  toward  that  worthy  end,  though  it  may
help  us  to  improve  our  pursuit  thereof”
(Churchland this collection,  p.  13;  emphasis
omitted).
Churchland’s publication has my full sup-
port. I agree with what he says, as I do with his
general  approach.  What  follows  is  a  comple-
mentary (and perhaps even extending) attempt
to improve our pursuit of moral understanding,
only on a different level: applied metascience of
neuroethics (NE), that is, the application of a
metascientific  approach  to  neuroethical  re-
search.1
In  this  commentary,  I  apply  the  (as-yet
unpublished)  bottom-up  approach  to  NE2
offered by Hildt et al. (forthcoming)3 to Church-
land’s  publication.  Thereby,  I  attempt  to
achieve my epistemic goal, which is both to loc-
alize the publication within NE and reveal its
degrees of relevance4 to neuroethical research; as
well  as  my  argumentative  goal,  which  is  to
demonstrate  that  applied  metascience  of  NE
can optimize NE itself and, hence, improve our
pursuit of moral understanding. 
In  the  following,  I  introduce  NE  and
present three typical examples of (disadvantage-
ous) contemporary top-down approaches to NE.
I then introduce a bottom-up approach to NE.
Following this, I apply the bottom-up approach
to NE to Churchland’s publication and present
my case study results. After this, I analyze my
case study results. Finally, I conclude with some
suggestions for future research.
2 Top-down approaches to neuroethics
NE,  as  a  combination  of  applied  ethics5 and
neurophilosophy6 (Hildt 2012, p. 11), is an inter-
disciplinary  field  at  the  intersection  of  neuros-
cience, medicine, and philosophy that deals with
philosophical, ethical, anthropological, and socio-
cultural issues related to neuroscience (Metzinger
2012, p. 36). In 2002, this versatile field emerged
in the wake of several US-American conferences
that were products of the Zeitgeist, that is, the
Decade of  the Brain from 1990 to 1999 (Hildt
1 In general, applied metascience is not limited to NE, but can be per-
formed with any kind of scientific discipline.
2 A bottom-up approach to NE is data-driven, whereas a top-down ap-
proach to NE is definition-seeking.
3 I would like to thank my colleagues in the Mainz Research Group on
Neuroethics/Neurophilosophy for providing  me the opportunity to
use the bottom-up approach to NE for the purpose of this comment-
ary.
4 The degrees of relevance of publications to neuroethical research, as
measured by the connection strengths between the subject categories
or topic prototypes, indicate the probabilities that publications will
prove fruitful for neuroethical research.
5 NE is neither another branch of applied ethics (Levy 2011, p. 3) nor
reducible to medicine ethics, bioethics, or a subfield thereof. Never-
theless, there is much overlap (Hildt 2012, pp. 11–12) between these
fields.
6 Neurophilosophy is a naturalistic and reductive approach towards a
unified theory of the mind–brain that requires detailed knowledge
about neuroscience (Walter 2013, p. 133).
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2012, p. 9). In particular, it is common to identify
the dawn of NE with a conference that was held
in San Francisco on May 13th and 14th, 2002:
Neuroethics:  Mapping the Field (Marcus 2002).
Before this, “most people saw no need for any
such field” (Levy 2007, p. 1), but the aforemen-
tioned issues came to be perceived as far more
important at this time. Nevertheless, we should
ask: what exactly is NE? Alongside the first ap-
proximation given above, I present three typical
examples of contemporary top-down approaches
to NE (which I don’t claim to be exhaustive).
From a knowledge-driven perspective (Ra-
cine 2008, p. 33), Roskies divides NE into two di-
visions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuros-
cience of ethics. According to Levy, the former
“seeks to develop an ethical framework for regu-
lating the conduct of neuroscientific enquiry and
the application of neuroscientific knowledge to hu-
man beings […] [whereas the latter studies]  the
impact of neuroscientific knowledge upon our un-
derstanding of  ethics  itself”  (Levy 2007,  p.  1).
Furthermore:
the ethics of neuroscience can be roughly
subdivided into […] (1) the ethical issues
and considerations that should be raised in
the  course  of  designing  and  executing
neuroscientific  studies  and (2)  evaluation
of the ethical and social impact that the
results  of  those  studies  might  have,  or
ought to have, on existing social, ethical,
and legal structures. (Roskies 2002, p. 21)
This top-down approach to NE emphasizes the
philosophical  challenges  posed  by  neuroscience
(Racine 2008, p. 34), for example, for “philosoph-
ical notions such as free-will, self-control, personal
identity, and intention” (Roskies 2002, p. 22).
From a technology-driven perspective (Ra-
cine 2008, p. 33), Wolpe identifies NE with “both
research and clinical applications of neurotechno-
logy, as well as social and policy issues attendant
to  their  use.  […]  [Thus,  it  is]  a  content  field,
defined  by  the  technologies  it  examines  rather
than  any  particular  philosophical  approach”
(Wolpe 2004, p. 1894). This top-down approach
to NE emphasizes the ethical challenges of using
neurotechnology  (Racine 2008,  p.  33),  for  ex-
ample, in healthcare and social practices (Racine
2008, p. 32).
From a healthcare-driven perspective (Ra-
cine 2008, p. 33), Racine & Illes (2008) propose a
definition of NE that “profiles the field as at the
intersection of neuroscience and bioethics defined
by a general practical goal, that of improving pa-
tient care for specific patient populations” (Ra-
cine 2008, p. 34). This top-down approach to NE
emphasizes  the  field  as  “both  a  scholarly  and
practical endeavor, akin to medicine, which at-
tempts  to  understand  and  intervene”  (Racine
2008, p. 34).
In  sum,  each  of  the  three  top-down  ap-
proaches to NE comprises (despite their conver-
gences) different issues in  different subject cat-
egories or topic prototypes with different relations
to each other. Seemingly, there are as many top-
down approaches to NE as philosophers in the
field (e.g.,  Farah 20127;  Gazzaniga 2005;8 Giord-
ano n. d.;9 Moreno 2003;10 Safire 200711)  but
probably even more.12
This unsystematic versatility is disadvant-
ageous for any attempt at a precise localization
of Churchland’s publication within the field be-
cause it suggests that the aforementioned top-
down approaches to NE are necessarily incom-
plete or even inconsistent. Hence, their applica-
tion can lead to unsatisfactory results—for ex-
ample, a localization of the publication that de-
pends  more  on  a  research  agenda  than  on
facts.13 The  bottom-up  approach  to  NE  at-
tempts to provide a solution to this problem. 
7 Farah characterizes NE as “a broad range of ethical, legal, and social
issues raised by progress in neuroscience” (2012, p. 572).
8 Gazzaniga understands NE as “the examination of how we want to
deal with the social issues of disease, normality, mortality, lifestyle,
and the philosophy of living, informed by our understanding of un-
derlying brain mechanisms” (2005, p. xv).
9 Giordano identifies NE with “(1) the study of neurological bases of
moral cognition, sense and action[,] (2) the field of study that ad-
dresses the moral  issues that arise in and from neuroscientific re-
search and the clinical practices and social effects/implications that
evolve  from  these  investigations[,  and]  (3)  the  reciprocal
interaction(s)  between  neurological  research/clinical  practices  and
other ethically relevant areas of biomedical sciences” (Giordano n.d.).
10 Moreno argues that NE “is in some ways old wine in a new bottle”
(2003, p. 153).
11 Safire defines NE as “the examination of what is right and wrong,
good and bad about the treatment of, perfection of, and welcome in-
vasion or worrisome manipulation of the human brain” (2007, p. 8).
12 Buniak et al. “provide an iterative, four-part document that affords
a repository of international papers, books, and chapters that ad-
dress the field in overview, and present discussion(s) of more particu-
lar aspects and topics of neuroethics” (2014, p. 3).
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3 A bottom-up approach to neuroethics
The bottom-up approach to NE is a quantitat-
ive approach (based on scientometric methods)
that, among other things, allows us to outline
the field from 1995 until 2012 through the de-
velopment of subject categories or topic proto-
types.14 Although similar  work has been done
before,  for  example,  by  Gooray &  Ferguson
(2013), Garnet et al. (2011), or Seixas & Basto
(2008), no bottom-up approach to NE based on
such a comprehensive database as that of Hildt
et al. (forthcoming) has yet been attempted.15
To be more precise, they use the Mainz NE bib-
liography.16
The  Mainz  bibliography  (launched  in
2006)  is  an  open-access  online  bibliography
compiled and provided by the Mainz Research
Group on Neuroethics/Neurophilosophy.17 Cur-
rently, the bibliography, as a multimodal com-
pilation  of  NE  publications  (e.g.,  anthologies,
edited  volumes,  journal  articles,  and  mono-
graphs),  contains about 4095 entries produced
between 1949 and mid-2014. On the one hand,
the  bibliography is  based  on  regular  scans  of
relevant journals  from neuroscience and medi-
cine (e.g.,  Cortex,  Der Nervenarzt,  EMBO Re-
ports,  Journal  of  Neurology,  Journal  of  the
American Medical  Association,  Nature,  Nature
Neuroscience,  Nature  Reviews  Neuroscience,
Neurocritical  Care,  NeuroImage,  Neurology,
Neuropsychology  Review,  Psychopharmacology,
Science,  and  Trends  in  Cognitive  Sciences),
13 For example, facts that are necessary for an adequate mapping of the
field may have been (un-)intentionally overlooked.
14 In  Hildt et al. (forthcoming),  the  developed subject  categories  or
topic prototypes form the basis for further scientometric analysis of
the data. For example, the subject categories or topic prototypes al-
low us to examine the development and institutionalization of NE
(e.g., temporal development, structure and disciplinary institutional-
ization, and reciprocal shaping of NE and related disciplines).
15 For example,  Gooray &  Ferguson’s (2013) database contains about
205 entries  dating  from 2000 to  2012.  The database  is  based on
books and articles from the following twelve journals:  Neuroethics,
American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience, Nature Reviews Neur-
oscience, Annual Review of Neuroscience, Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, Molecular Psychiatry, Nature Neuroscience, Neuron, Trends in
Neurosciences, Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology, Annals of Neurology,
and Progress in Neurobiology. In contrast, Hildt et al.’s (forthcoming)
database contains about 2296 entries dating from 1995 to 2012. It is
based on books and articles from more than 700 journals.
16 https://teamweb.uni-
mainz.de/fb05/Neuroethics/SitePages/Home.aspx
17 http://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/fb05philosophieengl/further-institu-
tions/research-group-on-neuroethics-and-neurophilosophy/
philosophy (e.g., American Journal of Bioethics
Neuroscience,  American  Journal  of  Bioethics,
Bioethics,  Cambridge  Quarterly  of  Healthcare
Ethics,  Consciousness  and  Cognition,  Journal
of Applied Philosophy,  Journal of Medical Eth-
ics, Medicine,  Health  Care  and  Philosophy,
Neuroethics,  Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psycho-
logy,  Science and Engineering Ethics,  Hastings
Center Report, The Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics, and Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics),
the  humanities,  and  social  sciences.18 On  the
other hand, the bibliography is based on regular
searches of both relevant citation (meta-)data-
bases such as  Web of Science,19 PubMed,20 and
Scopus,21 and relevant bibliographies such as the
Brainstorm22 newsletter of the Canadian Neuro-
ethics and Mental Health Interest Group. The
bibliography  also  incorporates  irregular  addi-
tions of relevant publications (mainly antholo-
gies, edited volumes, and monographs) as soon
as the Research Group on Neuroethics/Neuro-
philosophy becomes aware of them. Regarding
the selection criteria for publications from the
various sources, publications from neuroscience
or  medicine  are  selected  if  they  refer  to  the
philosophical, ethical, anthropological, or socio-
cultural  impact  of  the  presented  results,
18 The aforementioned selection of twenty-nine journals comprises those
journals that had added at least twenty publications to the Mainz
NE bibliography before mid-2014. The number of publications ranges
from  (at  least)  352  publications  (American  Journal  of  Bioethics
Neuroscience), 298 publications (American Journal of Bioethics), 211
publications (Neuroethics), 91 publications (Nature Reviews Neuros-
cience), 68 publications (Der Nervenarzt), 61 publications (Nature
Neuroscience), 58 publications (Journal of Medical Ethics), 57 pub-
lications (Journal of Neurology), 54 publications (Nature and Neuro-
logy), 46 publications (Bioethics), 40 publications (NeuroImage and
Science and Engineering Ethics), 37 publications (Trends in Cognit-
ive Sciences), 35 publications (Hastings Center Report), 31 publica-
tions  (Journal  of  the  American  Medical  Association,  Medicine,
Health Care and Philosophy, and Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psycho-
logy), 28 publications (Science), 26 publications (Cortex and EMBO
Reports),  23 publications  (Neurocritical Care and  Neuropsychology
Review), 22 publications (Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,
Journal of Applied Philosophy, and Psychopharmacology), 21 publica-
tions (The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics) to 20 publications
(Consciousness and Cognition and Theoretical Medicine and Bioeth-
ics). This selection of twenty-nine journals could be a fruitful start-
ing point for future  scientometric  research related to NE. Besides
this, the Mainz NE bibliography comprises journals that have added
less than twenty publications (e.g.,  Behavioral and Brain Sciences
and Philosophical Psychology).
19 http://www.webofknowledge.com
20 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed
21 http://www.scopus.com
22 http://www.ircm.qc.ca/LARECHERCHE/AXES/NEURO/NEURO-
ETHIQUE/PAGES/GROUPE.ASPX?PFLG=1033&lan=1033
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whereas publications from philosophy,  the hu-
manities, or social sciences are selected if they
refer to empirical results from neuroscience or
medicine. Moreover,  non-transdisciplinary pub-
lications are selected if the Research Group on
Neuroethics/Neurophilosophy considers them to
be relevant to NE.23
Subsequently,  Hildt et al. (forthcoming)
use a bibliometric analysis of the Mainz NE bib-
liography  from  1995  until  2012  to  develop,
among other things, fifteen subject categories or
topic  prototypes  on  content-based  criteria.
Thereby, each subject category or topic proto-
type  is  defined  by up to  thirty-one  keywords
that  appear  frequently  in  the  abstracts  and
titles of the publications. These fifteen subject
categories  or  topic  prototypes  are  Addiction,
Brain  Death  and  Severe  Disorders  of  Con-
sciousness,  Brain  Stimulation,  Enhancement,
Legal Studies, (Medical) Research and Medicine,
Molecular  Neurobiology  and  Genetics,  Moral
Theory,  Neuroimaging,  Neuroscience and Soci-
ety,  Neurosurgery,  Philosophy  of  Mind  and
Consciousness, Psychiatric and Neurodegenerat-
ive  Diseases  and  Disorders,  Psychopharmaco-
logy,  and  Social  and  Economic  Neuroscience.
Each subject category or topic prototype repres-
ents certain issues discussed in NE24 and, taken
together,  they outline  the  field.25 Importantly,
Hildt et al. (forthcoming)  also  determine,
among other things, the connection strengths26
between the subject categories or topic proto-
types within NE. Due to the content-based de-
velopment of the subject categories or topic pro-
totypes, a keyword-based search of the abstract
and title of any publication in NE allows us to
23 For example, a publication in medicine on the effects of neuroleptics,
antidepressants, stimulants, or tranquilizers is selected if it could of-
fer a contribution to the interdisciplinary debate on psychopharma-
cological cognitive enhancement.
24 Combinations of the subject categories or topic prototypes are able
to represent almost every issue discussed in NE.
25 Bottom-up approaches to NE attempt to provide maximally parsi-
monious bottom-up descriptions of their  target phenomenon (e.g.,
NE as a dynamical publication state-space). If the top-down descrip-
tions of NE, provided by the top-down approaches to NE, are neither
identical with nor reducible to the bottom-up descriptions of NE,
then, using a superficial analogy to Churchland’s eliminative materi-
alism (1981), an interesting question is whether or not (and, if so,
which of) the top-down descriptions of NE can be eliminated.
26 The connection strength between two subject categories or topic pro-
totypes depends upon the number of shared publications, that is, the
number of publications that can be assimilated to both subject cat-
egories or topic prototypes.
assimilate it to (at least) one subject category
or  topic  prototype27 and,  thereby,  localize  it
within NE.
In  the  following,  I  apply  the  bottom-up
approach  to  NE to  Churchland’s  publication
and present my case study results. I thereby at-
tempt to achieve the first part of my epistemic
goal, which is to localize Churchland’s publica-
tion within NE.
4 Case study results
The keyword-based search of the abstract and
title of Churchland’s publication reveals that it
can be assimilated to the subject  category or
topic prototype Moral Theory, that is, a subject
category or topic prototype that comprises pub-
lications on the psychology and neurobiology of
moral-decision making, publications on determ-
inism, free-will, and the function of moral the-
ory  in  the  neurosciences,  and publications  on
challenges to established interpretations of mor-
ally significant concepts such as autonomy, re-
sponsibility, and human nature.
This  subject  category or topic  prototype
has strong connections to the subject categories
or  topic  prototypes  Neuroimaging,  Philosophy
of  Mind  and  Consciousness,  and  Social  and
Economic Neuroscience,  and weak connections
to  the  subject  categories  or  topic  prototypes
Addiction, Brain Death and Severe Disorders of
Consciousness,  Brain  Stimulation,  Enhance-
ment,  Legal  Studies,  (Medical)  Research  and
Medicine, Molecular Neurobiology and Genetics,
Neuroscience  and  Society,  Neurosurgery,  Psy-
chiatric  and  Neurodegenerative  Diseases  and
Disorders, and Psychopharmacology. The strong
connections can be explained by a high number
of shared publications, that is, a high number of
publications that can be assimilated to both the
subject category or topic prototype Moral The-
ory and the subject category or topic prototype
Neuroimaging,  Philosophy  of  Mind  and  Con-
sciousness,  or  Social  and  Economic  Neuros-
27 A publication can be assimilated to a subject category or topic prototype
if its abstract and title contain (at least) one of the keywords that define
the subject category or topic prototype. As such, less than ten percent of
the total publications could not be assimilated to a subject category or
topic prototype. An interesting questions is whether or not (and, if so,
how) those publications can still be regarded as belonging to NE.
Boelsen, H. (2015). Applied Metascience of Neuroethics - A Commentary on Paul M. Churchland.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 6(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570580 5 | 9
www.open-mind.net
cience. The weak connections can be explained
by a low number of shared publications, that is,
a low number of publications that can be assim-
ilated to both the subject category or topic pro-
totype  Moral Theory and the subject category
or topic prototype  Addiction,  Brain Death and
Severe Disorders of Consciousness, Brain Stim-
ulation,  Enhancement,  Legal Studies,  (Medical)
Research and Medicine, Molecular Neurobiology
and  Genetics,  Neuroscience  and  Society,
Neurosurgery,  Psychiatric and Neurodegenerat-
ive Diseases and Disorders,  or  Psychopharma-
cology (Hildt et al. forthcoming).
In the  following,  I  analyze my results.  I
thereby attempt to achieve the second part of
my epistemic goal,  which is  to reveal the de-
grees  of  relevance  of  Churchland’s  publication
to  neuroethical  research;  as  well  as  my argu-
mentative  goal,  which  is  to  demonstrate  that
applied metascience of NE can optimize NE it-
self  and,  hence,  improve our pursuit  of  moral
understanding.
5 Analysis
First of all, the degrees of relevance of publica-
tions to neuroethical research are measured by
the  connection  strengths  between  the  subject
categories or topic prototypes. The connection
strengths  between  subject  categories  or  topic
prototypes depend upon the numbers of shared
publications.  The  numbers  of  shared  publica-
tions can be explained by the degrees of overlap
of content, methodology, or both. The degrees
of overlap of content, methodology, or both, in
turn, indicate the probabilities that publications
will prove fruitful for neuroethical research. In
short, the degrees of relevance of publications to
neuroethical research, as measured by the con-
nection strengths between subject categories or
topic prototypes, indicate the probabilities that
publications will prove fruitful for neuroethical
research.
Based on my results, Churchland’s public-
ation has high degrees of relevance to research
that can be assimilated to the subject categories
or  topic  prototypes  Moral  Theory,  Neuroima-
ging, Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, or
Social  and Economic Neuroscience because  of
the strong connections between the subject cat-
egory or topic prototype Moral Theory and the
subject  categories  or  topic  prototypes
Neuroimaging,  Philosophy  of  Mind  and  Con-
sciousness,  and  Social  and  Economic  Neuros-
cience. The strong connections can be explained
by  the  high  numbers  of  shared  publications.
The high numbers of shared publications can be
explained  by  the  high  degrees  of  overlap  of
either content, methodology, or both.28 This, in
turn, indicates high probabilities that Church-
land’s publication will prove fruitful for research
that can be assimilated to the aforementioned
subject  categories  or  topic  prototypes.  Con-
versely,  Churchland’s  publication  has  low  de-
grees of relevance to research that can be assim-
ilated to the subject categories or topic proto-
types  Addiction,  Brain Death and Severe Dis-
orders  of  Consciousness,  Brain  Stimulation,
Enhancement, Legal Studies, (Medical) Research
and Medicine,  Molecular Neurobiology and Ge-
netics,  Neuroscience and Society,  Neurosurgery,
Psychiatric and Neurodegenerative Diseases and
Disorders,  or  Psychopharmacology because  of
the weak connections between the subject cat-
egory or topic prototype Moral Theory and the
aforementioned subject categories or topic pro-
totypes. Here are some brief theoretical consid-
erations.
Churchland’s publication is highly relevant
to research that can be assimilated to the sub-
ject category or topic prototype Economic and
Social Neuroscience, suggesting that his idea of
reconceiving moral decision-making in terms of
PDP could  prove  fruitful  for  neuroethical  re-
search that refers to the underlying physiology
of economic or social decision-making. This ap-
plication might show that moral, economic, and
social decision-making share important proper-
ties  but  differ  in  others.  This  possible  result
could  then  be  fed  back  into  neuroethical  re-
search.
Churchland’s publication is also highly rel-
evant to research that can be assimilated to the
subject category or topic prototype  Neuroima-
28 Accordingly, publications that can be assimilated to the subject
category or topic prototype  Moral Theory,  Neuroimaging,  Philo-
sophy of Mind and Consciousness, or Social and Economic Neur-
oscience are highly relevant to the subject of Churchland’s pub-
lication.
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ging,  suggesting  that  his  idea  of  reconceiving
moral decision-making in terms of PDP could
prove  fruitful  for  neuroethical  research  that
refers to imaging techniques that visualize the
brain,  such  as  cranial  computed  tomography
(CCT),  electroencephalography  (EEG),  mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI), functional mag-
netic  resonance  imaging (fMRI),  and positron
emission tomography (PET) (Hildt 2012, p. 11).
For example, it could be used to reconceive the
classic distinction between off-track and truth-
tracking processes in genealogical debunking ar-
guments29 that  refer  to  fMRI  research  (e.g.,
Greene 2008 and Singer 2005). This application
might show that the classic distinction is neuro-
biologically implausible, which would mean that
arguments  relying  on  this  distinction  are  im-
plausible as well. This possible result could then
be fed back into neuroethical research.
Moreover, the possible (yet unrecognized)
relevance  of  Churchland’s  publication  to  re-
search that  can be assimilated  to the subject
categories or topic prototypes Addiction,  Brain
Death and Severe Disorders of  Consciousness,
Brain Stimulation, Enhancement, Legal Studies,
(Medical)  Research  and  Medicine,  Molecular
Neurobiology  and  Genetics,  Neuroscience  and
Society, Neurosurgery, Psychiatric and Neurode-
generative Diseases and Disorders, and Psycho-
pharmacology could have been emphasized more
strongly by including keywords in the abstract
and title that define the aforementioned subject
categories or topic prototypes, which, in turn,
could have  increased  the  connection  strengths
between those subject categories or topic proto-
types and the subject category or topic proto-
type  Moral Theory. A possible outcome of this
could have been the revelation of a systematic
overlap of content, methodology, or both that
has been neglected so far. And this possible res-
ult could then have been fed back into neuro-
ethical research.30
29 According to Kahane, the general form of a genealogical debunking argu-
ment is the following: S’s belief that p is explained by x. But, x is an off-
track process, that is, not a truth-tracking process, with respect to p.
Therefore, S’s belief that p is unjustified (Kahane 2011, p. 106).
30 Of course, this theoretical consideration is not meant to be a serious
criticism  of  Churchland’s  publication,  because  the  bottom-up  ap-
proach to NE was not available to him at the time of writing. It
rather shows that applied metascience of NE can help us discover
new pathways and directions for future neuroethical research.
This feedback process, in turn, can optim-
ize NE itself and, hence, improve our pursuit of
moral  understanding  because  it  can  help  to
“produce better ethical theories […] and contrib-
ute toward the great project of  better  under-
standing ourselves” (Levy 2011, p. 8).  Appar-
ently, a recurring pattern emerges: the bottom-
up approach to NE can be applied to neuroeth-
ical  research,  which,  in  turn,  can led  to such
results that can be fed back into it, which, in
turn,  can  optimize  NE itself  and,  hence,  im-
prove our pursuit of moral understanding.
6 Concluding remarks
In  this  commentary,  I  applied  the  bottom-up
approach to NE to Churchland’s publication. I
thereby  attempted  to  localize  the  publication
within NE and reveal its degrees of relevance to
neuroethical research, and to demonstrate that
applied metascience of NE can optimize NE it-
self  and, hence, improve our pursuit  of  moral
understanding.
Assuming that I have achieved the former,
which was my epistemic goal, the first and more
specific take-home message is that potential fol-
low-up  studies  on  Churchland’s  publication
should consider my case study results and ana-
lysis, that is, they should both bring together
research that can be assimilated to the subject
categories  or  topic  prototypes  Moral  Theory,
Neuroimaging,  Philosophy  of  Mind  and  Con-
sciousness,  and  Social  and  Economic  Neuros-
cience, and build bridges to research that can
be assimilated to the subject categories or topic
prototypes  Addiction,  Brain Death and Severe
Disorders of Consciousness,  Brain Stimulation,
Enhancement, Legal Studies, (Medical) Research
and Medicine,  Molecular Neurobiology and Ge-
netics,  Neuroscience and Society,  Neurosurgery,
Psychiatric and Neurodegenerative Diseases and
Disorders,  and  Psychopharmacology.  Assuming
that I have achieved the latter, which was my
argumentative goal, the more general take-home
message  is  that  future  neuroethical  research
should be more careful to take applied metas-
cience of NE into account because it can optim-
ize NE itself and, hence, improve our pursuit of
moral understanding.
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In the case of the bottom-up approach to
NE, this can be done at different stages of re-
search.  First,  while  seeking inspiration for  re-
search,  researchers  and  students  can  bypass
well-trodden paths in NE and identify (as yet)
unorthodox  ones  from  the  very  beginning.
Second, while pursuing these (or already well-
trodden) paths, scholars can optimize the effi-
ciency of their own research. Third, while pre-
paring their research for publication, they can
prepare abstracts and titles in such a manner as
to optimally reflect the publications’ (real or in-
tended) degrees of relevance to specific subject
categories  or  topic  prototypes.  Fourth  and fi-
nally, when taking it into account, they shape
NE in  such a way that  it  provides  input  for
more  fine-grained  follow-up  models  in  the
metascience of NE.
If this general idea is on the right track,
then applied metascience of NE is complement-
ary to (and perhaps even extends) Churchland’s
argument,  only  on  a different  level:  “knowing
how the brain works to generate and constantly
improve our moral understanding will not obvi-
ate the need to keep it working towards that
worthy end” (Churchland this collection, p. 13;
emphasis omitted), just as knowing how to op-
timize NE will not do this either, though both
“may help us to improve our pursuit thereof”
(Churchland this collection, p. 13). Only time
will tell.
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